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Abstract 
Purpose 
Extant research and practice of patent management are often occupied with how to best 
utilize patenting as a source of competitive advantage. This paper instead suggests a patent 
management trichotomy where firms make strategic decisions between patenting, 
publishing, and secrecy.    
Approach 
The paper is conceptual in nature and draws on received IP-management literature to 
develop an analytical framework. 
Findings 
We suggest that the choice between patenting, publishing, and secrecy can be understood 
in terms of differences in the degree to which the firm can appropriate value from the 
invention and the degree to which it can operate freely.  
Originality/value 
Through an analysis along the dimensions of direct and indirect appropriation as well as 
static and dynamic freedom to operate, the article conceptualizes the choice between 
patenting, publishing, and secrecy in a way useful for management decisions as well as for 
academics. 
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1 Introduction 
The preceding decades have witnessed an explosion in patenting (e.g., Hall 2005) - 
we can even speak of a pro-patent era (Granstrand, 1999) where the importance of 
IP management has grown enormously (e.g., Granstrand, 1999, Hemphill, 2013, 
Somaya, 2012). Today, we understand that technological resources often become 
the basis for competitive advantage and drivers of tremendous success and great 
fortune. The achievements of companies such as Apple, Google and more recently 
Tesla are but a few examples. We also understand that the control of such resources 
in the form of patents and intellectual property rights (IPRs) are critical in 
appropriating from technological inventions (Agostini et al., 2015, Itami and Roehl, 
1987, Lavie, 2006, Teece et al., 1997, Teece, 1998). However, recent literature on 
innovation and technology management has clearly demonstrated that not only tight 
and proprietary control over technologies are conducive to firm success (e.g., 
Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011, Harhoff et al., 2003, O'Mahony, 2003, von Hippel, 
2005, Ziegler et al., 2014). For example, sometimes it is beneficial to share 
technologies with other actors, e.g. to improve the competitiveness of a larger 
technological system and/or to benefit from complementary innovations, products, 
and services. A firm can then benefit from strategically disclosing certain 
inventions instead of patenting them, in order to enable a community of innovators 
to contribute to a technology (Peters et al., 2013). In other cases a firm may benefit 
from keeping inventions secret in order to limit possibilities for competitor invent-
arounds (Granstrand, 1999). Each one of these strategies – patenting, publishing 
and secrecy – have been covered extensively in previous research studies, even 
though research has been clearly biased towards patenting, often without 
considering its alternatives (Candelin-Palmqvist et al., 2012). In this paper, 
however, we address the patent management trichotomy. Specifically, we 
investigate the strategic decision firms make – at the level of the invention – 
between patenting, publishing and secrecy. Doing so we develop a conceptual 
framework that views patenting, publishing and secrecy as substitute choices 
associated with distinct advantages. Foreshadowing our findings, we suggest that 
the patent management trichotomy and the choice between patenting, publishing 
and secrecy can be understood in terms of whether the strategy (1) generates 
appropriation advantages and/or (2) increases the firm’s freedom to operate. In the 
following we first develop a conceptual framework based on these two dimensions, 
we subsequently suggest a number of propositions that outlines advantages of each 
strategy, and finally we discuss implications for theory and practice.  
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2 Towards a patent management trichotomy  
2.1 The functions of patents 
Patents are commonly misinterpreted as giving inventors the right to make or sell 
an invention. Being granted a patent does not mean that you have the right to 
practice that invention. Rather, patents provide the right to exclude others. Patents 
give their holders “the right to prevent third parties from making, using or selling 
the [patented] invention without their owners’ consent” [1]. By preventing 
imitation, patents enable innovation appropriation (value capture). Enabling 
appropriation is one important function of a patent [2]. Another function is to 
protect the freedom to operate (FTO) of the patent holder. Patents not only provide 
the right to exclude others, but also block others from excluding the patent holder, 
effectively protecting the freedom to operate. The logic is simple: as patents 
contribute to prior art (meaning that the invention has been made known to the 
public), no one else can patent the same thing later on, and thus no one else can 
exclude the patent holder from using its invention. Otherwise a firm that uses a non-
patented invention not known to the public could be forced to either stop using the 
invention or to sign a licensing agreement should someone decide to patent such an 
invention – thus limiting the firm’s freedom to operate.  
2.2 Antecedents to the patenting decision 
The decision to patent depends on a number of factors (see Table 1Table 1 for 
summary with references). First, the innovation type impacts the effectiveness of 
various means. Typically, product innovations are more suited for patent protection 
(relative to secrecy) than process innovations. Second, as for most types of 
strategies, there are differences between large and small firms in terms of how 
effective various protection strategies are, and patenting has been found to be 
relatively difficult for small firm to benefit from. Third, different industries are to 
various extent suitable for different types of protection strategies, due to the 
characteristics of the technologies, the legal situation (patent protection is for 
instance not applicable to all types of technologies), or something else. Fourth, the 
IP regime and the IPR laws and institutions available in either an industry or a 
nation impact the available managerial strategies. Patent protection on a market 
requires not only patent laws, but also that such laws are enforced (while monitoring 
is typically left to patent holders). Fifth, the market structure impacts the 
effectiveness and efficiency of various types of strategies. If a market is guarded by 
other means, for instance by state monopolies, it might be inefficient to protect it 
also by patent protection, since that is costly. 
In the following we discuss two important functions of patents – appropriation and 
freedom to operate – and identify two substitutes to patenting – secrecy and 
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publishing. These substitute strategies to a varying degree fulfill similar functions 
as patents do – and thereby lay the foundation for the patent management 
trichotomy. 
 
Table 1 Examples of factors impacting the decision to patent, publish, or keep secret 
Factor Examples References (examples) 
Innovation type Process 
Product 
Service 
Arundel and Kabla (1998), Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), Granstrand (1999) 
Firm size Large 
Small 
Arundel and Kabla (1998), Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), Davis (2006), Hanel 
(2006), Kitching and Blackburn (1998), 
Mansfield (1986) 
Industry Chemical 
Electronics 
Mechanical 
Pharmaceutical 
Software 
Chabchoub and Niosi (2005), Granstrand 
(1999), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), 
Mansfield (1986), O'Mahony (2003), 
Scherer (1983) 
Technological complexity Complex (‘Mul-tech’) 
Cumulative 
Discrete 
Bessen (2004), Bessen and Maskin (2009), 
Cohen et al. (2000), Granstrand et al. 
(1997), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Somaya 
et al. (2011), Teece (2009) 
IP regime Strong 
Weak 
Granstrand (2006), Hu and Jefferson 
(2009), Keupp et al. (2010), Teece (1986, 
2006) 
Market structure Competition 
Monopoly 
Oligopoly 
Bekkers et al. (2002), Blind and Thumm 
(2004), Granstrand (1999) 
 
2.3 Innovation appropriation strategies 
Innovation activities aim to create something new and useful. However, most 
innovators are not only concerned with value creation, but also value capture, i.e. 
to capture returns and profit from the innovation activities. The ability to capture 
returns from R&D investments and other innovation activities are commonly called 
appropriability (Levin et al., 1987, Teece, 1986). The appropriability regime – i.e. 
that extent to which inventions can be prevented from imitation – is related not only 
to legal impediments (patents, copyrights, etc.) but also to the nature of the 
technology (product/process, tacit/codified) (Teece, 1986, Teece, 2006). In case of 
a “tight” appropriability regime (meaning that imitation is difficult), the innovator 
will likely collect a large share of profits from innovation. By contrast, when 
imitation is easy, access to complementary assets is central to capture returns from 
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innovation (Teece, 1986). Teece (1986) early argued that tight appropriability 
regimes are rare, and that controlling complementary assets is therefore at core for 
innovators to appropriate returns from innovation. However, Teece as well as others 
have subsequently identified that appropriability is not exogenously given in an 
industry, but can be endogenously shaped by firms, governments, and technological 
change (Granstrand, 1999, Pisano, 2006, Pisano and Teece, 2007, Somaya, 2012, 
Teece, 2006). In addition, subsequent research have identified that tight 
appropriability regimes are not necessarily always most conducive for firm 
profitability (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006, Pisano, 2006), especially in industries 
where innovation is cumulative and complementary (Teece, 2009, David, 1993). 
The fact that the appropriability can be endogenously shaped means that 
appropriation strategies are important for enabling firms to capture returns from 
their innovation investments. A number of empirical studies have studied the 
relative effectiveness and importance of various means and strategies of protecting 
new products and processes. The effectiveness of different means varies widely 
across industries. For example, patents are typically more effective for product 
innovations than for process innovations (Granstrand, 1999, Levin et al., 1987). 
Still, the effectiveness of patents has been found to be limited relative to other 
means in numerous studies (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999, Cohen et al., 2000, 
Granstrand, 1999, Harabi, 1995, Kitching and Blackburn, 1998, Leiponen and 
Byma, 2009, Levin et al., 1987).  
The relatively low effectiveness of patents for appropriation can be related to some 
of the drawbacks with patenting. The main perceived drawbacks are the 
possibilities for competitors to legally invent around patents (illustrating the 
rareness of tight appropriability regimes, despite patent protection) and the 
information disclosure related to patenting (Harabi, 1995, Levin et al., 1987), as 
well as the high economic and non-economic costs of patenting (Cohen et al., 2000, 
Kitching and Blackburn, 1998). 
Firms typically rate informal means of appropriation more effective than patenting, 
and thus turn to sales or service efforts, market lead times, learning and cost 
reductions, secrecy, and switching costs to appropriate returns from their 
inventions. Most of these appropriation strategies can be used as complements to 
patenting on the level of an individual invention (Holgersson, 2012), for example 
in multi-protection strategies (Granstrand, 1999).  
Rather than being complements to patenting (i.e., being used simultaneously) – 
again, at the level of the individual invention – two strategies are substitutes to 
patenting (i.e., the strategies cannot be used simultaneously at the level of the 
individual invention). First, secrecy is a mutually exclusive alternative (substitute) 
strategy to patenting (Arundel, 2001). A trade secret has been defined as 
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, 
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technique, or process that (1) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
by proper means, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy” (the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985). While a patent 
gives its holder a temporary and limited monopoly advantage in exchange for the 
publication of the invention and various fees, secrecy provides a monopoly 
advantage as long as the secrecy remains secret, which might require significant 
efforts (Hannah, 2005), or as long as it is not independently developed by someone 
else. Thus, patenting and secrecy are substitute strategies to appropriate returns 
from innovation. Second, publishing is similarly a mutually exclusive alternative 
(substitute) strategy to patenting as an inventor cannot publicly disclose an 
invention and at the same time patent that invention. We use the concept of 
publishing to denote the act of publicly and strategically disclosing information, or 
more precisely “the act of creating novelty-destroying prior art in order to prevent 
or impede another agent from being able to obtain IP protection on the same or a 
similar invention or artistic or literary creation” (Peters et al., 2013, p. 122). The 
advantages of publishing, however, mainly pertain to freedom to operate and the 
co-creation of value as discussed later. We will now analyze these three strategies 
– patenting, publishing, and secrecy – more carefully along our two dimensions of 
interest – appropriation and freedom to operate. 
Appropriation refers to whether the strategy contributes to the firm’s ability to 
capture returns from investments in innovation (cf. Arundel, 2001, Granstrand, 
1999, Levin et al., 1987, Teece, 1986, 2006, Holgersson, 2013). Firms can 
appropriate directly through the sales of products, services and licenses based on a 
specific technology (Cohen et al., 2000, Somaya, 2012). Technology exclusivity, in 
turn, can be protected by patents or trade secrets (Arundel, 2001, Granstrand, 1999). 
Numerous studies have found that the protection of innovations and prevention of 
imitation is the main motive for patenting (Arundel et al., 1995, Blind et al., 2006, 
Cohen et al., 2000, Duguet and Kabla, 1998, Giuri et al., 2007, Granstrand, 1999, 
Thumm, 2004a, Veer and Jell, 2012, Thumm, 2004b). Publishing is not associated 
with such benefits, while secrecy is (Arundel, 2001, Hannah, 2005). This leads to 
the first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Value appropriation is better achieved though patenting 
and/or secrecy than publishing 
 
Whether patenting or secrecy is the superior strategy to appropriate value depends 
in part on the degree of complexity in the underlying technology, in terms of 
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interdependency of multiple inventions across organizational boundaries (Cohen et 
al., 2000, Granstrand et al., 1997, Somaya, 2012). Studies have found that firms 
patent to avoid trials and to reach strong positions in negotiations (Arundel et al., 
1995, Duguet and Kabla, 1998, Granstrand, 1999), to block other firms’ R&D and 
patenting efforts (Cohen et al., 2000), and to attract customers and venture capital 
(Holgersson, 2013). Additionally, in industries where standards are of importance, 
for instance in telecommunications, the possibility to reach a strong position in the 
standard by patenting essential inventions is an important motive to patent (Bekkers 
et al., 2002, Granstrand, 1999). What firms seek here are indirect appropriation 
advantages from patenting, without a direct link to the sales and margins of the 
patented technology. Most of these advantages become increasingly important with 
increasing technological complexity, for example since opportunities for 
interorganizational technological combinations increase (cf. Somaya et al., 2011). 
This leads to the second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2. As technological complexity increases, value 
appropriation is better achieved through patenting than secrecy 
 
2.4 Freedom to operate 
One important difference between patenting and secrecy is that while patenting 
leads to a registered disclosure of the patented invention, secrecy requires that there 
is no disclosure of the invention. One downside with patenting is therefore that the 
patent will provide competitors with information useful for imitation (Anton and 
Yao, 2004, Horstmann et al., 1985). However, this also means that, in contrast to 
secrecy, a patenting strategy will contribute to prior art, safeguarding some level of 
freedom to operate. Freedom to operate is important, since it means that a specific 
commercial business can be undertaken without infringing valid IPRs held by 
others within a certain domain. 
Patenting aims not only to “block competitors from using a technology and in so 
doing increase their costs and time for imitation and/or for inventing around the 
patent, in order to increase their willingness to pay for a license or to stay away 
from a market” but also to “block the competitors from blocking oneself” 
(Granstrand, 1999, p. 214). A secrecy strategy on the other hand runs the risk of 
having the invention patented by someone else, inhibiting the commercial 
opportunities for the firm utilizing a secrecy strategy. This is an inherent risk with 
relying upon trade secrecy protection [3].  
Thus far we have established that patenting protects the firm’s freedom to operate 
while secrecy does not. In addition to patenting, firms can strategically disclose 
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information about an invention as a means to protect its freedom to operate. As 
patentability requires novelty of the invention firms can limit other actors’ 
possibilities to patent through defensive publishing (also known as strategic 
disclosure) that “exhaust” the novelty of the invention (Bar, 2006, Barrett, 2002, 
Johnson, 2014, Parchomovsky, 2000, Peters et al., 2013). In other words, the 
publication strategy protects the firm’s freedom to operate by – similar to the 
patenting strategy – “block[ing] the competitors from blocking oneself”. This way, 
patenting and publication may reach the same goal in terms of freedom to operate 
although they are substitute strategies (as publishing exhausts future patentability) 
[4]. 
It is here important to note that neither patents nor publications provide the inventor 
with perfect freedom to operate; exclusive rights (e.g., patents) related to necessary 
complementary resources may be held by other agents restricting and blocking the 
freedom to operate, possibly leading to hold-up problems (Lemley and Shapiro, 
2007) and tragedies of the anticommons (Heller, 1998, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
Available reactive solutions include integration, acquisition of blocking rights, 
contractual agreements (license agreements), invalidation of blocking rights, and 
infringement (Granstrand, 1999, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2013). However, both 
patenting and publishing ensure some level of freedom to operate, in contrast to 
secrecy that does not ensure any freedom to operate [5]. This leads to the third 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. Freedom to operate is better achieved through patenting 
and/or publishing than secrecy 
 
There are some important differences between patenting and publishing in that 
patenting typically requires more time, more money and a higher inventive step 
than publishing, which is why publishing is sometimes preferred by firms lagging 
behind the most innovative firms in order to stop the innovators from patenting 
(Parchomovsky, 2000). Whether patenting or publishing is the superior strategy to 
achieve greater freedom to operate also depends in part on the degree of complexity 
in the underlying technology. Neither patenting nor publishing enable perfect 
freedom to operate, operations can still be inhibited by the IPRs held by other firms. 
However, with a portfolio of patents a focal firm has a defensive bargaining position 
that can be used to enable various types of licensing agreements easing the blocking 
power of other IPR holders (cf. Lemley and Shapiro, 2007, Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001), especially in complex technologies where the other IPR holders are 
dependent upon the focal firm’s patents (cf. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Shapiro, 
2001). To gain such bargaining power, and thereby to access (licenses to) other 
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firms’ IPRs, is one reason for why technology firms (such as Google) acquire large 
patent portfolios (from Motorola) (cf. Bogers et al., 2012b) [6]. A publication 
strategy, however, does not provide any property rights useful for bargaining. It is 
useful to make a distinction between static and dynamic freedom to operate. We 
introduce this distinction to denote on the one hand the freedom for business to 
operate based on current technologies (static freedom to operate) and on the other 
hand the freedom for business to operate based on future developments and 
improvements of current technologies (dynamic freedom to operate, see 
Proposition 5). This leads us to the fourth proposition:  
 
Proposition 4. As technological complexity increases, (static) freedom to 
operate is better achieved through patenting than publishing (and secrecy) 
 
Whether patenting or publishing is the superior strategy to achieve greater freedom 
to operate also depends upon the degree of cumulativeness in the underlying 
technology: When innovations and technologies are highly cumulative, future 
technologies build on previous ones (cf. Merton, 1973, Katila and Ahuja, 2002, 
Merton, 1968, Hargadon and Sutton, 1997). Previous patents held by one actor may 
then inhibit commercialization opportunities of future technologies for others, just 
as an innovator’s path may become blocked by complementary patents in the future 
(Rai, 2001, Chang, 1995, Bessen and Maskin, 2009, Murray and O'Mahony, 2007, 
Bessen, 2004). Again, a firm with a strong patent portfolio can avoid future hold-
up problems related to updated technologies, for example through cross-licensing 
agreements and various grant-back and assign-back license clauses (Granstrand and 
Holgersson, 2014). Thus patenting not only ensures some level of static freedom to 
operate, but also dynamic freedom to operate. Publishing does not provide the same 
level of dynamic freedom to operate. This leads to the fifth proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. As technological cumulativeness increases, (dynamic) 
freedom to operate is better achieved through patenting than publishing (and 
secrecy) 
 
3 Discussion 
We began by observing the explosion in patenting. The phenomenon is not limited 
to the US but the pro-patenting era has embraced large parts of the developed and 
developing world, most notably in Europe and Asia. Today, research acknowledge 
that the patent system is but one of many ways to incentivize investments in R&D 
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and to diffuse knowledge in the economy (David, 1993; Granstrand, 2003; 
Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010; Scotchmer, 2004; Wright, 1983). Our paper provides 
an original contingency framework that complements previous patent management 
research and outlines the choice between patenting, publishing and secrecy – the 
patent management trichotomy. Doing so, our paper highlights differences between 
these strategies and contributes to a more nuanced debate about the choice to patent 
or not, differences that are summarized in Figure 1. A number of contributions are 
discussed below. 
 
Figure 1 The patent management trichotomy 
 
First, by providing both static and dynamic freedom to operate and both direct and 
indirect appropriation advantages patenting is the strategy that presents the largest 
breadth of available commercialization strategies, not only by in-house production 
and marketing but also by patent sales (cf. Arrow, 1962, Tietze, 2012) and various 
types of licensing schemes (Alexy et al., 2009, Bogers et al., 2012a, Chesbrough, 
2003, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2013, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014), 
indicating the value of patents as real options (Somaya, 2012, Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2002, Nerkar et al., 2007).  
Second, our framework leads us to consider different forms of hybrid strategies. 
For example, by combining patenting with free licensing a strategy with 
characteristics close to those of publishing can be obtained (Ziegler et al., 2014), 
while maintaining the real options of patenting, such as improved accessibility 
potential to future technological developments through various license clauses (cf. 
O'Mahony, 2003, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). With that said, such options 
come at a price related to the direct and indirect costs of patenting (Holgersson, 
2013).  
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Third, we underscore the importance of understanding the systemic and dynamic 
nature of inventions. Here, we honed in on technological complexity and 
cumulativeness. Our propositions resonate with previous research suggesting that 
larger patent portfolios lessen hold-up risks in fragmented markets with many 
unknown technological dependencies  (Cohen et al., 2000, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, 
Jell et al., forthcoming).  
Fourth, while we treat the strategies of patenting, publishing and secrecy as 
substitutes on the single invention level, it is important to consider the 
combinatorial possibilities across time and across technologies. Patenting is always 
preceded by some kind of secrecy to uphold the novelty and thereby the 
patentability of the invention. After a patent application has been filed, the firm can 
choose to publish the invention through various channels in addition to the patent 
publication, for example in order to publish sooner than the time when the 
application is published (typically 18 months after filing). The firm may want to 
signal its intentions and future patents in order to keep other firms away from doing 
R&D in the same direction or to establish a dominant design (Peters et al., 2013). 
A firm can also combine different strategies for different but related inventions (cf. 
Liebeskind, 1996, Thomä and Bizer, 2013, Arora, 1997). For example, in a product 
system consisting of multiple modules one module may be effectively protected by 
secrecy, while a second module is protected by patents, and the inventions of a third 
module are published to enable cheap substitutes or complements at competitive 
prices to benefit the product system as a whole (Henkel et al., 2013). 
Fifth and finally, it is clear that the strategic decision between patenting, publishing, 
and secrecy has to be aligned with corporate strategies and environmental factors 
in order to reap the full potential of the technological resources (Alexy et al., 2009, 
Granstrand, 1999, Phelps and Kline, 2009, Reitzig, 2007). Thus, IPR strategies is a 
concern that should not be dealt with by IPR departments in isolation, but rather in 
close interaction with technology, business, and corporate strategies more 
generally. 
Our research also points to interesting avenues for future research. The most 
obvious path is to extend the analysis beyond appropriation and freedom to operate 
to include the creation of value in open settings. The contingency framework we 
develop is focused on (and limited to) technology, value appropriation, and freedom 
to operate. As such the framework may give undue priority to patenting. What we 
have demonstrated is that patenting is likely a superior strategy when firms are 
considering issues pertaining to appropriation and freedom to operate. However, 
firms need to consider antecedents to appropriation. For example, patent 
management – and more generally IP management – must ask how a chosen 
strategy supports or enable value creation. Indeed, both patents and publishing have 
another function – beyond enabling appropriation and freedom to operate – to allow 
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for the co-creation of knowledge. While patenting grants the inventor the right to 
exclude others from using the invention, patenting, as well as publishing, also 
discloses knowledge about the invention that allows others to build on that 
knowledge. An important rationale from governments to support the institution of 
patents is to create incentives to disseminate knowledge to the public, which others 
can subsequently build upon. Future research should address the patent 
management trichotomy with this in mind and incorporate value co-creation in their 
analysis. In such open landscapes publishing may rule over both patenting and 
secrecy. Here, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to incorporate the 
patent management trichotomy into a growing stream of literature on open business 
models, where value capture and value creation – but not freedom operate – are 
central components (cf. Chesbrough, 2013). This is probably also a useful setting 
for testing the framework empirically. More specifically the framework could be 
tested in a digitalization setting where complexity, cumulativeness, and new 
business models require appropriation as well as freedom to operate to different 
degrees for various (types of) inventions.  
4 Conclusion 
This article has sought to bridge the gap in extant literature on the relations between 
patenting, publishing, and secrecy, and the specific characteristics of these 
strategies.  
The patent management trichotomy was introduced, as well as the notions of direct 
and indirect appropriation advantage and static and dynamic freedom to operate, 
pointing at the characteristics of patenting, publishing, and secrecy, respectively. 
This has emphasized substitute strategies to patenting that patent management must 
consider, where secrecy provides direct appropriation advantages, publishing 
provides static freedom to operate, and patenting provides direct and indirect 
appropriation advantages as well as static and dynamic freedom to operate.  
This article has highlighted that patent management is not only about patenting, it 
is also about considering alternative strategies such as publishing and secrecy. 
Future research and practice should to a larger extent acknowledge the alternatives 
to patenting, their specific characteristics as described here, as well as the 
possibility to create hybrid strategies and combinations of strategies across 
inventions and time.  
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Notes 
1 See the European Patent Office: http://www.epo.org/applying/basics.html 
[Accessed 12 March 2016]. 
2 There are many other motives to patent too, see Holgersson (2013) for a review 
of that literature. 
3 This is true also in the US after its America Invents Act (2011), where the first-
to-invent criterion of patentability was changed to the first-to-file (a patent 
application) criterion. 
4 While patenting also includes publishing, we here separate between a pure 
publishing (not including a patent application) and patenting (including the 
publication of a patent application). For combinatorial possibilities, see Peters et al. 
(2013). 
5 It is noticeable here that a patenting strategy must always be combined with a 
secrecy strategy of some sort, albeit at different times of the innovation process. 
Before the patent application is registered, the invention must be held secret not to 
exhaust the patentability of the invention (cf. Hussinger, 2006). 
 
6 In an infringement case in 2012 in which Yahoo (plaintiff) accused Facebook 
(defendant) for patent infringement, Facebook counterclaimed that Yahoo was 
infringing ten of Facebook’s patents. Eight of these ten patents had been purchased 
by Facebook with the sole purpose to gain retaliatory power, according to Yahoo. 
This case eventually ended with a settlement, probably under terms much different 
from what Yahoo had hoped. See Ewing (2012) for a more detailed account on this 
case. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
